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 
Abstract—Biometric cryptosystems provide an innovative 
solution for cryptographic key generation, encryption as well as 
biometric template protection. Besides high authentication 
accuracy, a good biometric cryptosystem is expected to protect 
biometric templates effectively, which requires that helper data 
does not reveal significant information about the templates. 
Previous works predominantly follow an appropriate entropy 
definition to measure the security of biometric cryptosystems. 
In this paper, we point out limitations of entropy-based security 
analysis and propose a new security analysis framework that 
combines information-theoretic approach with computational 
security. In addition, we construct a fingerprint-based 
multibiometric cryptosystem using decision level fusion. Hash 
functions are employed in our construction to further protect 
each single biometric trait. The experimental results and 
security analysis demonstrate that the proposed multibiometric 
cryptosystem provides stronger security and better 
authentication accuracy compared to a cryptosystem based on 
single biometric. 
 
Index Terms—Biometric cryptosystems, min-entropy, 
Shannon-entropy, authentication accuracy, template protection, 
security. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ompared with traditional authentication techniques such as 
passwords and token cards, biometric-based techniques 
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offer a non-repudiable, more universal and reliable option for 
individuals’ authentication. A typical biometric-based 
authentication system is composed of two processes [1]: (1) the 
enrollment process, in which the system scans a user’s 
biometric image, creates a biometric template of biometric 
features extracted from the image, and stores the template in 
databases; and (2) the authentication process, in which the 
system scans an individual’s biometric data, extracts biometric 
features in the same manner and compares them with the 
template of the user the individual claims to be.  The system 
will output a match if according to a pre-defined similarity 
measure, a query is sufficiently similar to the template or a 
mismatch if it is not. 
However, widespread applications of biometrics have 
brought about new security challenges. As biometric templates 
are physically stored in databases or servers, raw images are 
able to be reconstructed once the templates are compromised by 
attackers [2]. Unlike traditional passwords or token cards, 
which can be reset or reissued, compromised biometric data is 
unlikely to be replaced due to the scarcity of biometric traits an 
individual possesses, which means a permanent loss of the 
chosen biometric features for authentication purposes. More 
seriously, since a biometric template is likely to be used 
repeatedly on different applications, a compromise of the 
template will put all these applications at risk and may lead to a 
great loss to the owner.   
Over the past few years, there has been a great deal of work 
on how to protect biometric templates. Basically, biometric 
protection techniques use transformed data instead of original 
biometric data or feature-based templates to authenticate users. 
Proposed methods can be classified into two types: (1) feature 
transformations (or cancelable biometrics) [3]-[6], and (2) 
biometric cryptosystems [7]-[11]. The former applies 
non-invertible transformations to modify original biometric 
data. The transformed template is stored for matching. Once the 
transformed template is compromised, the system can reissue a 
new one using different transformation parameters. Biometric 
cryptosystems provide an innovative solution for cryptographic 
key generation, encryption as well as biometric template 
protection. In biometric cryptosystems, original templates are 
replaced by biometric-dependent information (referred to as 
helper data), which assists in recovering cryptographic keys. 
Matching is performed indirectly by verifying the validity of 
recovered keys.  
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There exist two major criteria for judging the performance of 
a biometric cryptosystem: accuracy and security. The accuracy 
of biometric cryptosystems, similar to that of biometric 
authentication systems, is also measured by False Acceptance 
Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR). FAR is the 
probability of an imposter being accepted as an authorized user, 
while FRR is the probability of a legitimate user being rejected 
as an imposter. The security of biometric cryptosystems 
requires that helper data, once compromised by an attacker, 
should not reveal significant information about original 
biometric templates. A majority of papers in this field follows 
the average min-entropy of original biometric templates given 
helper data as a security metric [11]. However, Golic et al. [12] 
point out that the average min-entropy does not measure the 
statistical independence of random variables and introduced the 
conditional Shannon entropy instead. It is noteworthy that both 
the average min-entropy and the conditional Shannon entropy 
measure the security from the information-theoretic 
perspective, which merely reflects the probabilities rather than 
the actual values of biometric templates. Therefore, they cannot 
be completely equated with the security of biometric 
cryptosystems, especially those that are 
information-theoretically insecure but computationally secure. 
Unfortunately, this issue has not aroused due attention from 
researchers. What is worse, entropy measures are improperly 
employed in the security analysis of some biometric 
cryptosystems, especially in the case of fingerprint 
cryptosystems. 
Although biometric cryptosystems applying single biometric 
(such as fingerprint, iris, face etc.) have been widely studied, 
the accuracy and security of single biometric cryptosystems 
(SBC) are limited, which leads to the theoretical work and 
practical applications of multibiometric cryptosystems (MBC). 
Compared to SBC, MBC offer higher authentication accuracy 
and flexibility, wider population coverage and stronger 
security. In general, MBC can be classified into two categories 
based on different fusion modes: (1) fusion at the feature level 
(also known as biometric level), and (2) fusion at the decision 
level (also known as cryptographic level) [13]. The former 
fuses biometric features from multiple sources into a single 
template for identification and verification. The latter performs 
authentication in each SBC separately and outputs final 
decisions based on specific rules (such as n out of k rule based 
fusion). Fu et al. [13] provide the theoretical accuracy analysis 
of MBCF (multibiometric cryptosystems based on feature level 
fusion) and MBCD (multibiometric cryptosystems based on 
decision level fusion). They conclude that both MBCF and 
MBCD (MN-split mode) have higher authentication accuracy 
(lower FAR and lower FRR) than SBC. However, we find their 
analysis is flawed and therefore reanalyze the accuracy of MBC. 
From our results, the accuracy of both MBCF and MBCD 
(MN-split mode) is not theoretically better than that of 
corresponding SBC but influenced by several practical factors, 
such as selected biometric traits, fusion algorithms, decision 
rules, etc.  
Compared with MBCD, MBCF are more frequently 
proposed and studied in recent years since they can provide 
higher recognition accuracy as well as stronger security for 
single biometric templates [1], [14]-[16]. Sutcu et al. [1] design 
a combined template of fingerprint and face, and apply 
Pinsketch [11] for template protection. Nandakumar and Jain 
[15] adopt fuzzy vault to conceal a template fusing fingerprint 
and iris features among a host of chaff points. Camlikaya et al. 
[16] provide a template protection scheme by hiding fingerprint 
features among voice. However, as feature fusion transforms 
features from different biometric sources into the same 
universe, concatenation of these features can be arduous due to 
the inconsistency of different biometrics traits. Besides, the 
extendibility of MBCF is poor and may lead to the 
curse-of-dimensionality problem [17]. In contrast, 
implementation of MBCD avoids the difficulty of biometric 
feature unification and is more flexible in terms of choosing 
biometric sources and their corresponding cryptosystem 
constructions. These advantages motivate us to construct a 
practical MBCD. 
This paper mainly consists of two parts: a new 
bio-cryptosystem-oriented security analysis framework and a 
practical fingerprint-based MBCD construction. Our work 
makes the following contributions. It 
1. investigates the relations among different entropy 
measures and system security in depth under two 
common scenarios, 
2. revisits the entropy-based security analysis of some 
popular fingerprint-based cryptosystems and points out 
the limitation of entropy for measuring the security of 
biometric cryptosystems,  
3. proposes a new security analysis framework, which 
merges information-theoretic and computational 
security,  
4. revisits the analysis of the authentication accuracy of 
MBCF and MBCD, 
5. constructs a practical MBCD using fingerprints from 
multiple fingers of individuals. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Some 
preliminaries are presented in Section II, including basic 
concepts and terms used in the work. Section III concentrates 
on analyzing the correspondence between widely-applied 
entropy measures and systems security. In Section IV, we 
reanalyze the entropy-based security of several well-known 
fingerprint-related cryptosystems. A new security analysis 
framework for biometric cryptosystems is proposed in 
Section V. Section VI is dedicated to the accuracy analysis of 
MBC from a theoretical perspective, and a practical 
fingerprint-based MBCD construction is proposed in Section 
VII. Conclusions are given in Section VIII. 
II. PRELIMINARY 
A. Biometric Cryptosystems 
Generally, based on how helper data is derived, biometric 
cryptosystems can be classified into two categories: 
key-binding systems and key generating systems [18]-[22]. 
1) Key-binding systems 
Helper data is obtained by binding a chosen cryptographic 
key with a biometric template. During the 
matching/authentication process, the system attempts to 
recover the cryptographic key from the helper data using a 
biometric query (see Figure 1). The design of a key-binding 
biometric cryptosystem should always ensure that the key 
can be successfully recovered with overwhelming 
probability if the query is from a legitimate user. 
2) Key generating systems 
 Helper data is derived only from the biometric template 
and the cryptographic key is generated from the helper data 
and the biometric query. If the template and query are from 
the same user, then the generated keys will be the same with 
overwhelming probability. Key generating systems are also 
referred to as “fuzzy extractor” or “secure sketch” (see 
Figure 2), both of which are formally-defined in [11]. In 
general, a fuzzy extractor is composed of a secure sketch and 
a strong extractor. The secure sketch uses helper data to 
recover original biometric templates while the strong 
extractor generates nearly uniform random keys from 
biometric data. 
B. Metric Spaces ( )M  
Dodis et al. [11] define three metric spaces: Hamming 
metric, set difference metric and edit metric. The majority of 
biometric data falls into the first two metric spaces because a 
biometric template can always be represented as either a binary 
string or a set of features. 
They also define distance functions in each metric space to 
measure the difference between the template and query. 
Definitions of Hamming distance and set distance are given as 
follows. 
1) Hamming distance. Here nM F  for some alphabet F
. For ,  nx x F , the distance between them, denoted by
( , )dis x x , is the number of positions in which the 
strings x and x  differ. 
2) Set difference distance. Here M consists of all subsets of 
a universe U and | |U n . For ,x x M ,
( , ) 2dis x x x x x x . 
C. Widely-Used Biometric Cryptosystem Constructions 
There are many constructions of biometric cryptosystems, 
among which fuzzy commitment, fuzzy vault and Pinsketch are 
most popular. Brief descriptions of them are given below. For 
more details, please refer to [9]-[11]. 
1) Fuzzy Commitment (Hamming Metric) [9] 
This construction is made up of two algorithms: 
commitment and decommitment. To commit a template x  
that can be expressed by an n-bit string, the system selects a 
random codeword c and sets c x   . Then
( , ) ( ( ), )F c x h c  is stored in the system as a commitment, 
where h  is a hash (or one-way) function [9]. To decommit a 
query x , x   is calculated and mapped to the nearest 
codeword c , the decommitment is successful if 
( ) ( )h c h c . For codewords with the minimum distance d , 
the decommitment can always succeed as long as
( , )dis x x t  , where 2t d    .  
2) Fuzzy Vault (Set Difference Metric) [10] 
With a template that can be expressed by a set of biometric 
features: 1 2{ , ,....... }
s
sx x x x U   and a cryptographic key
0 1 2 1...
m
mk k k k k U  satisfying m s , a polynomial 
1 2
1 2 1 0( ) ...
m m
m mp x k x k x k x k
 
      is constructed and 
evaluated at each point in x to generate a genuine set
1{ , ( )}
s
i i ix p x  . Then a chaff point set 1{ , }
r
i i i sx y   is generated, 
where 1 2 1{ , ...... }i ix x x x  and ( )i iy p x . 1{ , ( )}
s
i i ix p x  and 
1{ , }
r
i i i sx y   compose a vault 1 1{ , ( )} { , }
s r
i i i i i i sv x p x x y  
(helper data). It is commonly known that a polynomial of 
degree 1m can be uniquely determined by m pairs of points, 
so if a query xoverlaps with x significantly, the polynomial 
p can be reconstructed. Further, both the key and template 
can be retrieved as well. 
3) Pinsketch (Set Difference Metric) [11] 
Pinsketch is a syndrome-based construction designed to 
deal with set difference. With a template 1 2{ , ,....... }sx x x x , 
the system generates helper data as 
1 3 2 3, 2 1( ) ( ) ( , ,... )t tSS x syn x s s s s , 
where
1
s
i
i j
j
s x and t is the error tolerance. When a query
1 2{ , ,....... }sx x x x is presented, the sketch generates the 
syndrome of x as 
1 3 2 3 2 1( ) ( , ,... , )t tsyn x s s s s , 
and retrieves the template x by  
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Fig. 1. The framework of key-binding systems 
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Fig.2. The frameworks of (a) a secure sketch and (b) a fuzzy extractor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( , ( )) ( )Rec x SS x supp v x , 
where ( ) ( ) ( )supp v x supp v x supp v x and 
( )supp v denotes the positions in which v is nonzero, which 
can be computed through the syndrome of v : 
1 1 3 3 2 1 2 1( ) ( , ,... )t tsyn v s s s s s s  
The construction guarantees that if ( , )dis x x t  ,
( , ( ))Rec x SS x x . 
D. Security of biometric cryptosystems 
In biometric cryptosystems, physically-stored helper data is 
always assumed public to attackers and the security has been 
put into precise mathematical terms by defining the amount of 
information by appropriate entropy measures. Most papers in 
this field [1], [11], [15] have been following the average 
min-entropy of original biometric templates X given helper 
data Y , i.e., ( | )H X Y ,  while some of them [12], [13], [23] 
use the conditional Shannon entropy, ( | )H X Y . The entropy 
measures used in the paper are listed below.  
                 ( ) logmax Pr( )xH X X x          (1) 
         ( ) Pr( ) log Pr( )
x X
H X X x X x        (2) 
   
( | )
( | ) log( [max Pr( | )])
                  log( 2 )
y Y x
H X y
y Y
H X Y E X x Y y
E
    (3) 
            ( | ) Pr( ) ( | )
y Y
H X Y Y y H X Y y        (4) 
III. ENTROPY AND SECURITY 
It is a well-established fact that entropy reflects the amount 
of information. However, entropy is also very useful to 
characterize security of a system. When we analyze security, 
we often ask about how difficult it is to obtain secrets (such as 
passwords, private keys, biometric traits, etc.) by an attacker. A 
typical strategy of the attacker is to try to guess a secret. There 
are two possible scenarios that the attacker can apply [12]: (1) 
one-step guessing until success, and (2) multiple-guessing until 
success. In the first scenario, the attacker aims to guess one 
secret from a large collection of secrets. To be more specific, 
the attacker makes a guess and then browses the collection of 
secrets until a match is found. In the second scenario, the 
attacker targets a specific secret and keeps guessing until 
success. The two scenarios are illustrated below with an 
example of dicing game.  
Dicing Game: Suppose there is an n-sided (label number 
1~n) loader dice. The number of the side facing upwards X
follows a distribution:
1
Pr( ) ,{ }1
n
i i
i
X i p p , which is 
known by a player.  
Now let us consider guessing the value of X in two different 
scenarios: 
1) One-step guessing until success—toss the dice and let 
the player guess. If the player succeeds, game stops. 
Otherwise, repeat dicing and guessing until the player 
succeeds. How many trials are expected to guess the 
value of X ? 
2) Multiple-guessing until success—toss the dice and let 
the player guess. If the player succeeds, game stops. 
Otherwise, the player is given another chance until he 
succeeds (no re-dicing). How many trials are expected 
to guess the value of X ? 
For convenience, we denote the expected number of 
guessing trials under one-step guessing and that under multiple- 
guessing scenarios by OET  and MET , respectively. Theorem 1 
characterizes the relation between the entropy and the number 
of guessing trials under each scenario. 
Theorem 1: Suppose a random variable X distributes over 
1 2{ , ,... }nU u u u and 1 2Pr( ) ,{ ... }i i nX u p p p p , then 
we have ( )2H XOET ,
1
n
M i
i
ET ip ,and 
1 2
2 2 2 2
O
M
O
ET n n
ET
ET
. 
Proof:  The best strategy for one-step guessing is to guess the 
most likely value every time.  Hence we get 
1
1
(1 max Pr( )) max Pr( )iO x x
i
ET X x X x i  
         1/ max Pr( )x X x  
         logmax Pr( )2 x X x    
         1log2 p  
         ( )2H X  
In terms of multiple-guessing, the best strategy is to guess 
the values of X in decreasing order of probability, so we have
1
n
M i
i
ET ip  
Since 1
1
1
n
i
i
np p , we can deduce 11/ On p ET  . If
 On ET , X is uniformly distributed over U and  
1 1
1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
n n
OO
M i
i i
ETi n ET
ET ip
n
 
If  On ET  , MET approximates to the minimum value when
12 3 4 1/ 1
... pp p p p p , 11/ 1 1 11 1/pp p p and 
1 11/ 2 1/ 3
, ,... 0p p np p p , and reaches the maximum value 
when 2 3 1(1 ) / ( 1)np p p p n . Therefore, we 
have  
1
n
M i
i
ET ip  
     1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 / 2 1 1p p
p p p p
 
         
1
1
1 / 2
p
 
         
1
2 2
OET
 
And  
1
1
1
(1 ) ( 2)( 1)
1 2
n
M i
i
p n n
ET ip p
n
 
         
1 (1 1 / )( 2)
2
O
O
ET n
ET
  
         
2
2 2 O
n n
ET
 
Therefore, 
1 2
2 2 2 2
O
M
O
ET n n
ET
ET
. 
According to Theorem 1, min-entropy ( )H X depends on 
the maximum probability of a random variable, and reflects
OET  very well. ( )H X  measures MET to some extent [24] as 
both of them are influenced by the overall distribution (the 
more uniform the distribution is, the higher they are, and vice 
versa.). As far as biometric cryptosystems are concerned, 
helper data Y is stored in databases or servers instead of a 
biometric template X . Therefore, one-step guessing and 
multiple-guessing trials about the template are reflected by 
( | )H X Y and ( | )H X Y , respectively (assume Y is given). 
IV. ENTROPY ANALYSIS OF FINGERPRINT-BASED BIOMETRIC 
CRYPTOSYSTEMS 
It is assumed that for secure biometric cryptosystems, their 
helper data does not reveal too much information about original 
biometric templates. Consequently, they must retain high 
average min-entropy/conditional Shannon entropy. However, it 
has been found that the template entropy given helper data 
highly interacts with authentication accuracy. Buhan et al. [25] 
show that there is a relation between the template entropy given 
the helper data and the error rates of a biometric cryptosystem, 
which is defined as ( | ) logH X y FAR   . Dodis et al. [11] 
give the upper bound of the average min-entropy ( | )H X Y  
of a secure sketch—when X is uniformly distributed over M ,
( | ) log ( , )H X Y K M t  , where ( , )K M t is the largest K for 
which there exists an ( , , )M K t code (An ( , , )M K t code is a 
subset 
1 2{ , ,... }Mc c c of K elements of M that can correct up to 
t  errors. More details can be found in [11]). For a q-ary block 
code C of length n (i.e. ,nM Q Q q   ), 
0
( , ) ( 1)
t
n i
i
n
K M t q q
i
 
  
 
 , which is called the Hamming 
bound, and we call C perfect if and only if it attains the 
Hamming bound. Obviously, the upper bound of entropy-based 
security is maximized when perfect codes are applied, but in 
real applications, error-correcting codes cannot always achieve 
the Hamming bound, e.g., it is impossible to construct a 6-bit 
perfect code which can correct up to 2-bit errors, so the 
entropy-based security of real systems may vary depending on 
different-sized error correcting codes used [26]. According to 
their work, it can be observed that the upper bound of template 
entropy given helper data depends on the error tolerance levels 
allowed during authentication. In particular, if the error 
tolerance level of a biometric cryptosystem is large, then the 
corresponding template entropy given helper data will be low 
as both ( , )K M t and 1FAR are small, and vice versa. Therefore, 
it is unlikely that biometric traits suffering from high intra-class 
variation, such as fingerprints, can be applied to construct 
biometric cryptosystems which perform well in both 
authentication accuracy and entropy-based security. However, 
this issue has not gained deserved attention from experts 
specializing in fingerprint recognition. On one hand, they claim 
that their proposed fingerprint-based bio-cryptosystems are of 
high recognition accuracy (low FAR and FRR). On the other 
hand, they recommend these systems by demonstrating good 
entropy-based security. In this paper, we argue that some 
assumptions they make when analyzing entropy-based security 
are not well founded, which have produced confusing analysis 
results.  
A number of fingerprint-based cryptosystems adopt fuzzy 
vault [10], which is proposed by Juels and Sudan for key 
encryption purpose. According to Juels and Sudan’s analysis, 
suppose a fuzzy vault is made up of a biometric template
sx U , an encoding polynomial
1 2
1 2 0( ) ...
m m
m mp x key x key x key , and a vault v of size r , 
then there are roughly | |m s
r
U
s
 distinct polynomial 
candidates p p that are able to produce v , i.e., 
| | 1( )| ) log( m s
r
H UP V
s

    
 
  ( p is interpolated by exactly
s points in v ) . Admittedly, the entropy-based security of fuzzy 
vault is high when m approximates s and the number of chaff 
points is large enough. However, with the increase of m , the 
error tolerance decreases, while excessive chaff points will 
consume much computer storage. Therefore, ideal parameters 
are unachievable in practice. 
The polynomial reconstruction in fuzzy vault [10] is a special 
case of Reed-Solomon list decoding problem, and the best 
choice for decoding is generally the classical algorithm of 
Peterson-Berlekamp-Massey [27]-[29]. However, this 
algorithm takes the majority opinion among all possible 
solutions, and can tolerate only up to s m  errors, which means 
the valid polynomial p can be found only when the number of 
discrepancies in the biometric data x x  is less than
( ) / 2s m . As is widely known, fingerprint data has large 
intra-class variability—fingerprint traits from the same user 
captured by different devices or at different time may vary 
significantly.  Therefore, if Reed-Solomon decoding is directly 
used in fingerprint-based cryptosystems, it will result in many 
false rejects for genuine users [14].  
To overcome this limitation, Nandakumar et al. [18] apply 
CRC (cyclic redundancy check) to fuzzy vault to help identify 
the correct polynomial from a set of candidates, thus improving 
the error tolerance up to 2( )s m . In their construction, the 
biometric features in the template are minutia attributes, which 
are represented as 16-bit binary strings, while s , m  and r are set 
to 24, 9 and 224, respectively, for the best recognition 
performance. According to their parameters, we can roughly 
evaluate the number of polynomial candidates p given a vault
v , which is 16 15 72
224 224
(2 ) / 10 0
24 24
. That is to say, 
the only polynomial that can produce v is p itself. 
Consequently, we can deduce ( | ) 0H K V and further
( | ) 0H X V  because x and k are bijective given v . They 
apply the same construction to multibiometric templates 
(fingerprint-iris) based on feature level fusion [15], and claim 
that the entropy-based security of the new vault could reach up 
to 49 bits (They assume the genuine and chaff points are 
uniformly distributed, thus concluding the entropy security 
corresponds to the security in the brute-force attack scenario). 
However, we find the assumption and conclusion unjustified. 
Even if all genuine and chaff points are distributed uniformly, 
the values of the encoding polynomial at genuine points, (x)p , 
are not uniform. To be more precise, not all the polynomials of 
degree 1m constructed by interpolating m  unique pairs of 
points from the vault can be the encoding polynomial as the 
valid polynomial should satisfy the condition that there are 
exactly s pairs of points in the vault falling on it. In fact, with 
the parameters they gave ( 84, 14, 884s m r ), we can 
calculate the actual average min-entropy
16 70
884
( | ) log((2 ) 1) 0
84
VH X . This misleading 
entropy analysis is also adopted in [26]. 
Some other fingerprint-based cryptosystems require 
verification information, such as hash values to assist key 
recovery, but extra entropy loss is often neglected. Here, we 
take hash functions for example to help understand how hash 
values reduce entropy. Given any k-bit hash value
( ), ,j jy hash x x X X n , the expected number of 
,ix X i j being able to produce y can be expressed as:  
1
1
1
2 (1 2 ) 1)( /
1
2
n
k i ki k n
i
n
N i n
i
, 
Therefore, we can deduce log(( 1 () )| 1) / 2kX nH Y . 
When ( ) logH X n ( X is uniformly distributed), the 
entropy loss due to revealing hash values can be computed as:
2
( ) ( | ) log
2 1
k
k
n
H X H X Y
n
. For a fixed n , the 
entropy loss rises with the increase of the length of hash values, 
and the corresponding average min-entropy declines. Liu et al. 
[30] propose a fingerprint-based key-binding biometric 
cryptosystem which consists of three levels of secure sketch. 
The first two: wrap-round and Pinsketch, which deal with 
random errors and burst errors respectively, are essentially a 
type of soft two-level construction while the third level is a 
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. The output of the three levels 
of secure sketch, denoted by 1 1 1 0 0{ } ,{ } ,{ } ,( , )
N N N
i i i i i iA A SC    , 
are stored explicitly for key recovery. Nevertheless, since 
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme itself cannot identify the 
validity of recovered local structures, besides the three levels of 
sketch data, a collection of hash values of minutia structures, 
1{ ( )}
N
i ih SC  , are required to be stored extra for verification 
purposes. For the sake of convenience, we denote the sum of 
the sketch data and the collection of hash values by
 1 1 1 0 0 1{ } ,{ } ,{ } ,( , ),{ ( )}N N N Ni i i i i i i iY A A SC h SC     . Although 
the authors have shown the security of the system in two 
respects: Pinsketch security and hash security, the rigorous 
entropy-based security analysis of the overall system is not 
given. Actually, as they adopt SHA256 to encrypt each minutia 
structure, which is represented by a 108-bit binary string 
iSC (
5n ), based on the previous deduction, the remaining 
entropy of
iSC due to revealing ( )ih SC can be computed as:
108 256( | ( )) log(1 (2 1) / 2 ) 0i iH SC h SC . Further, we 
can deduce ( | ( ), ) ( | , ) 0i i i i i iH NS h SC H NS SC    since 
iNS (raw biometric feature vector) is uniquely determined by
iSC and i . The result can be extended to the entire system as: 
1 1 1 1({ } | ) ({ } | { ( )} ,{ } ) 0
N N N N
i i i i i i i iH NS Y H NS h SC (Readers 
can look into [30] for details about the construction and the 
meanings of the symbols). Yang et al. [19] propose an 
alignment-free fingerprint bio-cryptosystem based on modified 
Voronoi neighbor structures, in which the authors apply a 
two-level secure sketch (Pinsketch plus fuzzy vault) to tolerate 
errors as well as protect fingerprint templates. They claim that 
the entropy of their construction can reach 112 bits even if the 
Pinsketch is compromised by attackers. Nevertheless, similar to 
Liu et al.’s, their scheme also requires to store hash values of 
local structures for key recovery, which should be considered 
as a part of the helper data that may leak information about the 
templates. If we assume that SHA256 is adopted, their scheme 
has weak entropy-based security as well, i.e., 
8*14 256( | ) log(1 (2 1) / 2 ) 0i iH X Y , where iX  and iY  
are the binary representations of the ith local structure and its 
hash value, respectively. Admittedly, shorter hash values may 
decrease the entropy loss, but it meanwhile results in the 
degradation of authentication accuracy as more collisions 
occur. 
V. A NEW SECURITY ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK FOR BIOMETRIC 
CRYPTOSYSTEMS 
Considering the low entropy (approximate to 0) of the above 
biometric cryptosystems, can we conclude that they are all 
insecure? The answer is no. As a matter of fact, entropy 
measures only reflect the information-theoretic security of a 
system, which assumes the attacker has unlimited computing 
power. Particularly, in biometric cryptosystems, entropy 
measures the guessing trials under the condition that given 
helper data, the possible corresponding values of biometric 
templates and their probabilities are known, ignoring the 
difficulty of deriving these values from the helper data. 
Admittedly, entropy is significant in measuring the amount of 
information and uncertainty. Besides biometric cryptosystems, 
entropy measures are also widely employed in many other 
security applications, especially network traffic analysis 
[31][32]. However, all attackers in practice are computationally 
limited. In this case, to measure the security of biometric 
cryptosystems more comprehensively, we should also consider 
the computational hardness of the derivation of biometric 
templates from helper data (referred to as computational 
security) besides related entropy. The current state of 
knowledge has implied the decoding of Reed-Solomon codes, 
also known as the polynomial reconstruction, as a 
cryptographically hard problem when s rm [33], [34]. Also, 
a good cryptographic hash function is always pre-image 
resistant, which means it is computationally difficult to get 
original messages given hash values. Therefore, even though 
the biometric cryptosystems listed above have no 
information-theoretic security, they are still computational 
secure.   
There are some works in the literature dealing with 
computational security of bio-cryptosystems [14], [18]. 
However, the analysis is merely conducted on specific systems 
with known parameters rather than on general constructions. 
Also, the previous work considers either entropy-based security 
or computational security, while there are some cases in which 
entropy-based and computational security coexist. For instance, 
in some cryptographic scenarios that involve highly classified 
information, users concern more about FAR than FRR. That is, 
the systems target minimizing FAR to ensure that only valid 
users have access to the information. If a fingerprint-based 
fuzzy vault is applied, then it is supposed to only accept 
fingerprint queries that have high similarity to templates, which 
means a high value will be assigned to the degree of the 
polynomial m . As a result, the entropy will increase. To be 
more precise, if 162U  and , ,s m r are assigned 24, 20 and 
224, respectively, the entropy will become
16 20 24
224
2 ) 1) 42.5
24
log(( 
 
  
 
. Under this circumstance, the 
fuzzy vault construction has both entropy-based security and 
computational security as it is still time-consuming to search 
for 20-degree polynomials interpolated by 24 points in the 
vault. Considering the lack of a general security framework for 
bio-cryptosystems and the inability of conventional security 
analysis methodology in handling the above scenario, in this 
section, we propose a novel bio-cryptosystem-oriented security 
analysis framework, which jointly considers 
information-theoretic and computational security.  
Without loss of generality, we consider a generalized 
biometric cryptosystem, which takes a biometric template
x X and generates helper data by ( )y F x , where F is an 
encoding algorithm. Given y , the decoding algorithm that finds 
out a value x X such that ( )F x y is denoted by ( )F y
( ( ( ))F F y y ) and the average number of elementary 
operations of F  is represented by ( ( ))N F y . The security 
analysis is given below under one-step guessing scenario and 
multiple-guessing scenario, respectively (For reasons of 
simplicity, we assume ( | ) ( | )H X y H X y , which means 
X is uniformly distributed over all values that may produce y ). 
Apparently, if x is public to the attacker ( ( ( )) 0N F y  ), 
under one-step guessing scenario, he can hold the value to 
browse a collection of the same systems and will succeed by 
average ( | )2H X y guessing trials, and that is what min-entropy 
measures. However, in practical applications, the correlation 
between x and y is not always transparent, which means the 
attacker has to perform decoding first to obtain x from y and 
then conducts guess trials. If each guess trial is considered to be 
an elementary operation, then we can expect that the average 
number of elementary operations for success guess is
( | )
( ( )) 2
H X y
N F y   . By replacing guessing trials with 
elementary operations for security measurement, we rewrite the 
security metric from 
( | )
( | ) log2
H X y
H X y   to
( | )
( | ) log( ( ( )) 2 )
H X y
OS X y N F y
  . Correspondingly, we 
give the new security metric of the whole system under 
one-step guessing as follows. 
Definition 1. Under one-step guessing scenario, the security 
of a biometric cryptosystem considering computational 
security can be measured by: 
( | )( | ) log( ( ( )) 2 )( | ) log( 2 ) log( 2 )
H X y
OS X y N F y
O y Y y YS X Y E E
  
    
 
1) If  for any , ,i jy y Y i j  , ( | ) ( | )i jH X y H X y   and 
  ( ( )) ( ( )) ( )i jN F y N F y N F    , 
( | )
( | ) log( ( ) 2 )
H X Y
OS X Y N F
  . 
2) If ( ( )) 0N F y  for any y Y ,  
( | ) ( | )OS X Y H X Y . 
3) If ( | ) 0H X Y  , 
1( | ) log ( ( ( )) 1)O y YS X Y E N F y


   . 
In the multiple-guessing scenario, the case becomes more 
complicated as the attacker can perform multiple guessing trials 
that are inter-dependent. In particular, given ( )y F x , the 
attacker performs the decoding algorithm F  to get a value 
1x X such that 1( )F x y . If 1x x , the attacker succeeds and 
stops decoding, or he continues decoding to obtain the next 
value of X ( 2x ) that may produce y until he succeeds.  If we 
assume the attacker succeeds at the ith guessing trial and denote 
the average number of elementary operations he conducts for 
decoding so far by ( ( , ))N F i y , then the average number of 
elementary operations of recovering X given y  is 
1
(Pr( | )( ( ( , )) ))
yn
i
i
x y N F i y i

  , where yn represents the number 
of the values of X being able to generate y , and
1
Pr( | )
yn
i
i
x y i
denotes the expected number of guessing trials. Since X is 
uniformly distributed over these yn values, we can deduce 
( | )Pr( | ) 1 / 2 H X yi yx y n and then rewrite the expression 
into 
( | )2
( | )
1
(2 ( ( ( , )) ))
H X y
H X y
i
N F i y i

  , where ( ( , ))N F i y also 
equals the average number of elementary operations the 
attacker needs to carry out to find i values from X that can 
produce y . Accordingly, the new security metric of the whole 
construction under multiple-guessing can be given as follows. 
Definition 2. Under multiple-guessing scenario, the security 
of a biometric cryptosystem considering computational 
security can be measured by: 
( | )2
( | )
1
( | ) log 2 ( ( ( , )) )
H X y
H X y
M y Y
i
S X Y E N F i y i

   
( | )2
( | ) ( | )
1
log 2 ( ( , )) (1 2 ) / 2
H X y
H X y H X y
y Y
i
E N F i y  
1) If ( ( , )) 0N F i y  for any y Y , 
( | )2
( | )
,
1
( | ) log 2 log
H X y
H X y
M y Y y Y M y
i
S X Y E i E ET 

  .  
Considering the similarity between ,M yET and conditional 
Shannon entropy ( | )H X y (see section III), ( | )MS X Y
can be measured by ( | )H X Y to some extent in this case. 
2) If ( | ) 0H X Y  , ( | ) log ( ( (1, )) 1)M y YS X Y E N F y    
log ( ( ( )) 1)y YE N F y   . 
From the new security analysis framework, it can be 
observed that the security of biometric cryptosystems is not 
only determined by the related entropy, but also influenced by 
the computational hardness of the decoding algorithm of each 
construction. In consequence, it is inappropriate to conclude 
that a fuzzy commitment of high entropy is more secure than a 
fuzzy vault of low entropy considering the decoding of the 
former is a simple XOR operator while that of the latter 
involves polynomial reconstruction, a much more complicated 
problem. As entropy (information-theoretic security) depends 
on the error tolerance of applied biometric, which is 
biologically determined and sometimes difficult to change 
artificially even by adopting different authentication algorithms 
[18], [19], [30], [35], to further improve the security of 
biometric cryptosystems, efficient, hard-inverse encoding 
algorithms can be employed when computational cost and time 
for encoding are relatively negligible.   
VI. ACCURACY ANALYSIS OF MBC  
Compared with single biometric cryptosystems, 
multibiometric cryptosystems can offer higher authentication 
accuracy and security, as well as larger population coverage. 
Therefore, they have been frequently studied in recent years. 
Based on previous work, Fu et al. [13] formulate the formal 
definition of MBC at two fusion levels: feature level (MBCF) 
and decision level (MBCD). To be more precise, the latter can 
be further divided into three sub-models: MN-split model ( n
out of k  fusion rule), non-split model (OR rule) and package 
model (And rule). Fusion at feature level is a map
1 2: ... m
bb b b
BF U U U U    , which transforms features from 
different biometric sources into the same universe and 
constructs a united template
b
Tx U . Then Tx will be bound 
with a cryptographic key k and generate helper data. During the 
authentication process, if a query b
Qx U satisfies
( , )T Qdis x x t , both Tx and k can be recovered. In a MBCD, a 
cryptographic key is bound with a biometric template set
, 1 ,{ } ,
im b
T i i T ix x U consisting of templates from different 
biometric sources, and the recovery will succeed if at least n 
biometrics from a query set , 1 ,{ } ,
im b
Q i i Q ix x U and their 
counterparts in the template set satisfy , ,( , )Qi T i iidis x x t , where
it is the error tolerance of the ith biometric. 
Fu et al. [13] analyze both MBCF and MBCD theoretically 
in terms of security, privacy and accuracy. Although they 
conclude that both MBCF and MBCD (MN-split model) have 
lower FAR and FRR than SBC, we find there are theoretical 
flaws in their analysis.  
Now let us consider the accuracy of MBCF. If we denote the 
query from the imposter and the legitimate user by 
IMx and LEx , 
respectively, the FAR and FRR of a MBCF can be expressed 
as: 
Pr( ( , ) )MBCF T IMFAR dis x x t   
Pr( ( , ) )MBCF T LEFRR dis x x t  , 
The accuracy improvement over the ith SBC can be computed 
by: 
ireduction SBC MBCF
FAR FAR FAR   
, ,Pr( ) P( , r( )) ( , )IM i T IMT i idis x x t dis x x t    
, ,
, ,
Pr( ( , ) & ( , ) )
Pr( ( , ) & ( , ) )
T i IM i i T IM
T i IM i i T IM
dis x x t dis x x t
dis x x t dis x x t
  
  
 
ireduction SBC MBCF
FRR FRR FRR   
, ,Pr( ) P( , r( )) ( , )LE i T LET i idis x x t dis x x t    
, ,
, ,
Pr( ( , ) & ( , ) )
Pr( ( , ) & ( , ) )
T i LE i i T LE
T i LE i i T LE
dis x x t dis x x t
dis x x t dis x x t
  
  
 
According to the above equations, it is not theoretically 
guaranteed that the first probability on the right-hand exceeds 
the second one. Whether or not MBCF have higher 
authentication accuracy than SBC depends on the selected 
biometric sources, fusion algorithms, the error tolerance t , etc. 
As a matter of fact, inappropriate selection and concatenation 
of different biometric traits can even degrade the accuracy of 
the system.  
 In the case of MBCD, Fu et al. [13] express the FAR and 
FRR of MN-split model as: 
1
i
n
MBCD SBC
i
FAR FAR

  
1
1
i
m n
MBCD SBC
i
FRR FRR
 

  , 
and therefore they conclude that 
iMBCD SBC
FAR FAR and 
, 1...
iMBCD SBC
FRR FRR i n  . However, their accuracy analysis 
does not consider all the situations in which an imposter is 
accepted by the system and a legitimate user is rejected. We 
reanalyze the accuracy of MN-split model by Theorem 2. 
Theorem 2. In a general construction of MN-split model, for
m biometrics 1{ }
m
i iX X  , the cryptographic key can be 
decrypted if at least n sub-keys are successfully decrypted by 
their corresponding biometrics. We have  
1 ( , , ) ( , , )
(1 )
k l
m
im
MBCD SBC SBC
i n j k C m i j l C m i j
FAR FAR FAR
 
 
 
   
     
 
1 1 ( , , ) ( , , )
(1 )
k l
m
im
MBCD SBC SBC
i m n j k C m i j l C m i j
FRR FRR FRR
 
 
 
     
     , 
 where ( , , )C m i j denotes the jth combination of selecting i
biometrics from m . In particular, if each biometric has the 
same FAR and FRR, then we can get 
(1 )
m
i m i
MBCD SBC SBC
i n
m
FAR FAR FAR
i


 
  
 
  
1
(1 )
m
i m i
MBCD SBC SBC
i m n
m
FRR FRR FRR
i

  
 
  
 
  
Proof: If an imposter attempts to recover the cryptographic 
key, he/she must successfully decrypt at least n sub-keys 
encrypted by the corresponding biometrics. Let ,MBCD iFAR be 
the probability that the imposter gets the key by decrypting i
sub-keys. Then we can calculate the FAR of MN-split model as 
follows. 
, , 1 ,...MBCD MBCD n MBCD n MBCD mFAR FAR FAR FAR     
                ,
m
MBCD i
i n
FAR  
Since these i sub-keys can be any i  ones from m , ,MBCD iFAR
can be expressed as 
,
( , , ) ( , , )1
(1 )
k l
m
i
MBCD i SBC SBC
k C m i j l C m i jj
FAR FAR FAR , 
 and therefore  
1 ( , , ) ( , , )
(1 )
k l
m
im
MBCD SBC SBC
i n j k C m i j l C m i j
FAR FAR FAR
 
 
 
   
    . 
Similarly, if a legitimate user fails to decrypt the key, then it 
means the biometrics he/she presents can only decrypt at most
1n sub-keys. In other words, he/she fails to decrypt at least
1m n sub-keys.  Then the FRR of MN-split model can be 
computed in the same manner. 
, 1 , 2 ,...MBCD MBCD m n MBCD m n MBCD mFRR FRR FRR FRR        
                ,
1
m
MBCD i
i m n
FRR  
                
1 1 ( , , ) ( , , )
(1 )
k l
m
im
SBC SBC
i m n j k C m i j l C m i j
FRR FRR
 
 
 
     
     , 
where ,MBCD iFRR is the probability that the legitimate user fails 
to decrypt i sub-keys.  
 If we set 1n  , then MN-split model becomes non-split 
model, and the FAR and FRR can be calculated as: 
1 1 ( , , ) ( , , )
(1 )
k l
m
im
MBCD SBC SBC
i j k C m i j l C m i j
FAR FAR FAR
 
 
 
   
     
               
1
1 (1 )
i
m
SBC
i
FAR

    
iSBC
FAR  
1
i i
m
MBCD SBC SBC
i
FRR FRR FRR

   
Similarly, the FAR and FRR of package model can be 
computed by setting n m . 
MBCDFAR =
1
i i
m
SBC SBC
i
FAR FAR

  
1 1 ( , , ) ( , , )
(1 )
k l
m
im
MBCD SBC SBC
i j k C m i j l C m i j
FRR FRR FRR
 
 
 
   
     
1
1 (1 )
i
m
SBC
i
FRR

    
iSBC
FRR  
According to Theorem 2, we cannot conclude that MBCD 
(MN-split model) always have lower FAR and FRR than SBC. 
A simple case in point is
3
1{ }i iX X  , in which
1 1
0.4SBC SBCFAR FRR  , 2 2 0.2SBC SBCFAR FRR  and
3 3
0.1SBC SBCFAR FRR  . Obviously, if n  is set to 1 or 3, the 
MN-split model becomes non-split model or package model. 
Accordingly, (n 1) (n 3) 0.568MBCD MBCDFAR FRR    and
(n 3) (n 1) 0.008MBCD MBCDFAR FRR    . When n is set to 2, 
(n 2) (n 2) 0.124MBCD MBCDFAR FRR    . No matter which 
value n takes, the corresponding MBCD does not provide lower 
FAR and FRR simultaneously than the 3rd SBC. In general, 
there are several factors that contribute to the accuracy of a 
MBCD, including the accuracy (FAR and FRR) of each SBC, 
the number of total biometrics m , and the threshold n . 
Theorem 3 shows a special case in which the resultant MBCD 
has lower FAR and FRR than the SBC composing it. 
Theorem 3. (Major-vote-based [36], [37] MN-split model) 
For 2 1 3m n   biometrics 1{ }
m
i iX X  , the cryptographic 
key can be decrypted if at least n sub-keys are successfully 
decrypted by corresponding biometrics. If 
1 2
... 1 2
mSBC SBC SBC SBC
FAR FAR FAR FAR  
1 2
... 1 2
mSBC SBC SBC SBC
FRR FRR FRR FRR , 
 then we have MBCD SBCFAR FAR and MBCD SBCFRR FRR . 
Proof: Let us consider the probability that an imposter fails 
to decrypt the key MBCDGRR  (Genuine Reject Rate), which can 
be expressed as 
1
(1 )
m
i m i
MBCD SBC SBC
i m n
m
GRR GRR GRR
i
 
2 1
2 1
2 1
(1 )
n
i n i
SBC SBC
i n
n
GRR GRR
i

 

 
  
 
  
As 1 1 2SBC SBCGRR FAR , according to condorcet’s jury 
theorem [38], [39], we can get MBCD SBCGRR GRR and 
therefore MBCD SBCFAR FAR . 
Similarly, the probability of a legitimate user successfully 
recovering the key (Genuine Accept Rate) is 
(1 )
m
i m i
MBCD SBC SBC
i n
m
GAR GAR GAR
i
 
2 1
2 1
2 1
(1 )
n
i n i
SBC SBC
i n
n
GAR GAR
i
 
As 1 1 2SBC SBCGAR FRR , we can conclude that
MBCD SBCGAR GAR  and therefore MBCD SBCFRR FRR . 
VII. FINGERPRINT-BASED MBCD (MN-SPLIT MODEL) 
Compared with MBCD, MBCF are stronger in terms of 
protecting single biometric templates, thus being more studied 
over the past few years [1], [14]-[16]. However, fusion at 
feature level also leads to some issues in practical applications, 
such as incompatibility of features from different biometric 
traits, entropy loss for fusion and the curse-of-dimensionality 
problem. In contrast, MBCD avoid the difficulty of biometric 
feature unification and can retain the advantages of each 
biometric and its corresponding cryptosystem construction. 
Moreover, MBCD are more extensible and can better meet the 
requirements of some scenarios [40] and applications. While Fu 
et al. [13] theoretically analyze the template privacy, key 
security and accuracy of MBCD, they do not propose a system 
implementation. 
In the section, we present a practical MBCD construction 
based on MN-split model, which uses fingerprints from 
multiple fingers to secure cryptographic keys. A 
registration-free, Delaunay triangle-based matching algorithm 
proposed by Yang et al. [41] is adopted, which avoids 
authentication errors caused by inaccurate registration.  
A. Delaunay Triangulation [41] 
Triangulation is a process of dividing a region of space into 
multiple smaller triangular regions. Suppose a fingerprint 
image consists of n minutiae, which are denoted by
1{ }
n
i iM m  . The process to establish the Delaunay 
triangulation of M is composed of two steps, which are 
illustrated with Figure 3. Firstly, a Voronoi diagram of the 
minutiae set M is constructed, which partitions the whole 
image into n  regions such that all the points in the ith region 
are closer to im than to any other minutia. Secondly, given the 
Voronoi diagram, we connect the minutiae in neighboring 
Voronoi regions and form the Delaunay triangulation net. 
B. Features Extraction 
We denote the ith triangle of a Delaunay triangulation net by
{ , , }
{ , , }, { , , , }i a b c k k k k kk a b cT m m m m x y t  , where minutiae
, ,a b cm m m are vertexes of the triangle, ( , )k kx y is the 
coordinates of the minutia
km , k is the orientation of its 
associated edge, and {0,1}kt  is the minutia type (0 
corresponds to ridge ending while 1 corresponds to ridge 
bifurcation). Unlike [41], we do not use minutia type in our 
scheme due to its instability, so the feature vector of 
iT is 
expressed by 
{ , , , , , }i ab bc ca ab bc caFV d d d     
2 2( ) ( )ab a b a bd x x y y     
2 2( ) ( )bc b c b cd x x y y     
2 2( ) ( )ca c a c ad x x y y     
1tan a bab a
a b
y y
x x
 
 
  
 
 
1tan b cbc b
b c
y y
x x
 
 
  
 
 
1tan c aca c
c a
y y
x x
 
 
  
 
 
The triangle
iT and its features are demonstrated in Figure 4. 
Suppose there are s triangles in the Delaunay triangulation 
net, then the fingerprint image can be expressed by a set of 
these s local feature vectors as 1{ }
s
i iSV FV  . In our 
construction, to reduce matching processing time, we choose 
the first 80 Delaunay triangles ( 80s   ) from the whole set in  
 
am
bm
cm
abd
bcd
cad
ab
bc
ca
 
Fig. 4. A triangle and corresponding local features. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Delaunay triangulation of a fingerprint image. 
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Fig. 5. The encryption procedure 
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Fig. 6. The decryption procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ascending order of the distance between them and the singular 
point or the center of the fingerprint image. Both d and are 
quantized and represented as bit strings of length 4, so 
iFV  can 
be represented by a 24-bit binary string. 
C. Encryption 
We use a two-level secure sketch to achieve error tolerance 
in our construction. The encryption procedure is shown in 
Figure 5 and the detailed steps are given below: 
1) The first level encryption 
Suppose the multibiometric template in our MBCD 
consists of templates from ,2 10m m different fingers, 
given the template of the jth finger , , , 1{ }
s
T j T j i iSV FV  , we 
apply a hash function 1(.)H to each , ,T j iFV and form a 
transformed template , 1 , , 1( ) { ( )}
s
T j T j i iTrans SV H FV  . If the 
length of 1(.)H is l , we can use fuzzy vault ,sub jV  to bind the 
transformed template ,( )T jTrans SV  with a sub-key ,sub jK of 
length jld  bits. As the sub-keys will be used as the input of 
the second level secure sketch, we set jd d for all fingers 
in our experiment to ensure all the sub-keys are of the same 
length.  In addition, we compute the hash value of ,sub jK
( 2 ,( )sub jH K ) for sub-key verification. 
2) The second level encryption 
The second level encryption is essentially the Shamir’s 
secret sharing scheme. Given a cryptographic key K  
provided by the user, if we expect it to be decrypted 
successfully when at least n  sub-keys are decrypted, then we 
can divide K into n segments 0 1 1, ,... nk k k  and encode them 
into a polynomial p , i.e. 1 21 2 0( ) ...
n n
n np x k x k x k .
p x is evaluated at each sub-key ,sub jK to generate a 
genuine set
, ,. 1{ , ( )}
m
sub j sub j jK p K  .  In our construction, 
however, we store the hash values instead of the sub-keys 
themselves. Thus the output of the entire system which needs 
to be stored explicitly (the helper data) consists of 
2 , ,. 1{ ( ), ( )}
m
sub j sub j jH K p K  and , 1{ }
m
sub j jV . 
D. Decryption 
The decryption procedure is shown in Figure 6 and the 
detailed steps are explained in the following: 
1) The first level decryption 
Given the template of the jth finger from the query, we 
apply Delaunay Triangulation, feature extraction and hash 
function 1H  in a row and get , 1 , , 1( ) { ( )}
s
Q j Q j i iTran SV H FV  . 
Then the sub-key is recovered (polynomial interpolation) by 
pairing ,( )Q jTran SV and the elements in ,sub jV . If the 
recovered sub-key rec, jK  satisfies 2 rec, 2 ,( ) ( )j sub jH K H K , 
, ,( , ( ))rec j sub jK p K  will be added into the unlocking set. 
Apparently, the sub-key ,sub jK can always be decrypted from
,sub jV  as long as ,T jSV and ,Q jSV have at least d common 
elements. 
2) The second level decryption 
If at least n sub-keys are decrypted from the first level 
secure sketch—the size of the unlocking set is no less than n , 
the cryptographic key K can be decrypted. 
E. Experimental Results  
Our construction uses fingerprints from multiple fingers of 
an individual to encrypt the cryptographic key. Unfortunately, 
we cannot find any open, standard database to meet our 
requirements. Therefore, we collected fingerprint images from 
150 cooperative subjects with balanced demographic 
characteristics including age, gender and nationality, using an 
optical sensor (CROSSMATCH Verifier 300 LC2.0) in our lab 
[42]. The subjects mainly consisted of students and staff in 
three Australian educational institutions: UNSW@ADFA, 
Deakin University and La Trobe University.  The age 
distribution was as follows: (a) between the ages of 18 and 25: 
45%, (b) between the ages of 25 and 35; 45%, and (c) older than 
35 years: 10%. The gender distribution was almost balanced 
with only a 10% gap between females and males. In terms of 
the nationality distribution, 45% subjects are Asians, 45% are 
Indians or Bangladeshis, and the remaining 10% are 
Caucasians. Each subject was asked to provide images of ten 
fingers and we captured the image of each finger four times 
under different distortion. This database has been released 
publicly within a 3D fingerprint database package [43]. Note 
that most existing multimodal databases are combining 
biometric features from different persons. Such simulation 
databases have ignored the mutual dependency of different 
biometric features from the same person, which can produce 
misleading performance results [44]. 
The standard FVC protocol is applied in our experiment. In 
particular, each image from a finger of a subject is compared 
with other 3 images from the same finger of the subject to 
calculate FRR while the first image from a finger of a subject is 
compared with the first image from  the corresponding finger of 
other subjects to calculate FAR. To avoid repeated comparison, 
if image 1 as the template has been already compared with 
image 2, then when image 2 is chosen as the template, it will 
not be compared with image 1 again. Since there are 4 images 
for each finger from 150 subjects, the total numbers of genuine 
test and imposter test are ((4 3) / 2) 150 900 and
(149 1) 149 / 2 11175 , respectively.  
Firstly, we test the matching accuracy of each finger using 
the Delaunay triangle-based algorithm. The corresponding 
FRR and FAR when 9d  are shown in Table I, from which we 
can learn that single fingerprint cannot offer desirable 
performance in terms of identifying genuine users—the right 
thumb has the best FRR, which is still up to 7.44%. Then we 
use Theorem 2 in Section VI to analyze the accuracy of MBCD 
in two scenarios ( 4m and 10m ). The theoretical results 
in Table II show that our MBCD can significantly lower FRR 
without compromising much on FAR when n  is properly 
chosen, e.g., 2n  in both scenarios. To further justify our 
theorem, we finally conduct experiments for these two 
scenarios. In the scenario 4m  , two index and two fingers are 
employed as the multibiometric template, the FRR/FAR of the  
 
 
proposed system when 2n is 2.67%/0%, while the 
counterpart in the other scenario is 0.67%/0%. The ROC curves 
of the SBC (single fingerprint) and MBCD under both 
scenarios are shown and compared in Figure 7. Overall, the 
experimental results conform to the theoretical results in 
spite of the small FRR/FAR gap arising from the 
non-uniformity of experimental data. 
F. Security Analysis 
We analyze the security of our construction in two respects: 
single fingerprint protection and cryptographic key protection, 
under the condition that the helper data are compromised by the 
attacker. Similar to other fingerprint-based cryptosystems, our 
construction has no information-theoretic security either for 
low FRR. In particular, if we set 9d  and ,| | 880sub jV  (the 
number of chaff points is 10 times that of genuine points), the 
average min-entropy of the first level secure sketch (fuzzy vault) 
is
24 9 80
, ,
880
2( | ) log(( ) ) 01
80
T j sub jH SV V
    
 
  . Therefore, 
the strength of our construction in terms of single fingerprint 
protection will degrade into the computational complexity
,log( ( ( )) 1)sub jN F V . Given a sub-vault ,sub jV , the 
computational complexity to decrypt the fuzzy vault by brute 
force attack [18] can be computed as: 
880 80
3.6e+09
9 9
   
   
   
. 
In addition, even if the sub-vault is decoded, the security of the 
template can still rely on the hash function. As each triangle is 
represented by a 24-bit binary string in the proposed system,  if 
the attacker tries all 24-bit binary strings to find the pre-image 
of a given hash value, he/she will need to conduct average 
24(1 2 ) / 2 hash operations, so the overall security now 
become 24log(3.6e+09 (1 2 )*9 / 2 1) 32bits . It is 
noteworthy that the security is evaluated by simply assuming 
polynomial interpolation and hashing to be only one 
elementary operation, while the real security can be much 
higher as both of them involves multiple computational 
elementary operations. By using different hash functions in 
diverse applications, the proposed construction can also resist 
the cross-matching attack. 
 As far as cryptographic key protection is concerned, the 
attacker has to decode at least n  sub-vaults. Therefore, the 
computational security is 1 ( , )log(min 1)i C m n iN  , where iN is 
the average number of elementary operations of the ith 
combination, which is generated by selecting n biometrics from 
m ones, denoted by ,
1
( ( ))
n
i sub j
j
N N F V . Apparently, iN is 
roughly n  times ,( ( ))sub jN F V , which is the average number of 
elementary operations required to decrypt the cryptographic 
key in the corresponding SBC. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Security and accuracy are two major factors influencing the 
performance of a biometric cryptosystem. The majority of work 
in this field uses average min-entropy or conditional Shannon 
entropy as the security metric. However, in this paper, we point 
out the limitation of entropy in measuring the security of 
biometric cryptosystems, and correct the entropy-based 
security analysis of some popular fingerprint-based 
cryptosystems. Then we propose a new security analysis 
framework, which jointly considers information-theoretic and 
computational security, thus being able to measure the security 
of biometric cryptosystems more comprehensively. 
In terms of accuracy analysis, we reanalyze the accuracy of 
MBCF and MBCD from the theoretical perspective. The results 
show that better accuracy of MBC than SBC is not theoretically 
guaranteed. As a matter of fact, whether or not MBCF or 
  
  
 Fig. 7. ROC curves comparison. 
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TABLE I 
MATCHING PERFORMANCE ON EACH FINGER 
  
Finger No FRR FAR 
1 (right thumb) 0.0744 0.0001 
2 (right index finger) 0.0744 0.0003 
3 (right middle finger) 0.1244 0.0001 
4 (right ring finger) 0.2244 0.0000 
5 (right little finger) 0.3467 0.0000 
6 (left thumb) 0.0900 0.0017 
7 (left index finger) 0.1422 0.0002 
8 (left middle finger) 0.1367 0.0001 
9 (left ring finger) 0.2578 0.0002 
10 (left little finger) 0.4044 0.0000 
 
TABLE II 
MBCD PERFORMANCE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
  
MBCD m=4 (FRR/FAR) m=10(FRR/FAR) 
n=1 0.0002/0.0007 0.0000/0.0027 
n=2 0.0059/0.0000 0.0000/0.0000 
n=3 0.0718/0.0000 0.0000/0.0000 
n=4 0.3998/0.0000 0.0003/0.0000 
n=5 NA 0.0031/0.0000 
n=6 NA 0.0213/0.0000 
n=7 NA 0.0971/0.0000 
n=8 NA 0.3021/0.0000 
n=9 NA 0.6429/0/0000 
n=10 NA 0.9576/0.0000 
 
MBCD can offer an improvement of accuracy over SBC 
depends on several factors: selected biometric traits, fusion 
algorithms, decision rules, etc. Finally, we propose a practical 
MBCD construction, which uses fingerprints from multiple 
fingers to encrypt the cryptographic key. The experimental 
results and security analysis prove that the proposed 
construction provides stronger security and better 
authentication accuracy compared to the corresponding SBC.   
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